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Quinlan v. Camden USA Inc., 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 30 (July 29, 2010)1
CIVIL PROCEDURE 
 
 
 
Summary 
Appeal from district court’s award of attorney fees and costs in favor of Camden 
pursuant to a rejected offer of judgment on behalf of Quinlan.  The Court decided 
whether Nevada would adopt an implied consent to service by facsimile for an offer of 
judgment under NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68. 
 
Outcome 
The court denied the possibility of implied consent to service within the context 
of an offer of judgment.  Consequently, the court held that the district court erred in 
awarding attorney fees and costs to Respondent because the offer was never properly 
served.  
 
Factual and Procedural History 
Appellant, Audrey Quinlan, lost a personal injury suit against respondent, 
Camden USA, Inc., and was ordered by the district court to pay Camden $41,976 in 
attorney fees and costs.  Previous to trial, Camden submitted by facsimile an offer of 
judgment, and although appellant’s attorney received the offer, he did not expressly 
consent to service by fax as required under NRCP 5(b)(2)(D).2
  
  
 
Discussion 
The issue raised on appeal was whether the district court properly enforced 
respondent’s offer of judgment.  An offer of judgment is statutorily created and subject to 
the express rules of its genesis.  NRS 17.115, NRCP 5(a), and NRCP 68 all require 
“service” for an effective offer of judgment.3  Respondent’s faxed offer was not “served” 
according to the dictates of NRCP 5(b). NRCP 5(a) specifies, “every . . . . offer of 
judgment . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.”4  NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68(a) 
also say an offer of judgment must be “serve[d].” 5
Although NRCP 5(b)(2) allows service by fax, it does so only if the receiving 
attorney “has consented to service by electronic means.”
 An offer of judgment cannot shift fees 
and costs under NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 unless it complies with NRCP 5(b). 
6
The Court rejected such a position by looking at the language of NRCP 
5(b)(2)(D), which uses “shall” to state its requirement of express, written consent, filed 
  Notwithstanding appellant’s 
lack of express consent to service by fax, Camden argues that Quinlan’s lawyer supplied 
an implied consent to service because he occasionally sent case-related papers via 
facsimile, including an informal offer to settle. 
                                                 
1By Zachary Lowe.  
2 NEV. R. CIV. P 5(b)(2)(D).  
3 See NEV. REV. STAT § 17.115; NEV. R. CIV. P. 5(a); and NEV. R. CIV. P 68(a). 
4 NEV.R. CIV. P. 5(a). 
5 See, NEV. REV. STAT § 17.115; and NEV.R.CIV.P. 68(a). 
6 NEV.R.CIV.P. 5(b)(2). 
with the clerk, to service by electronic means.7  The Court interprets the use of “shall” as 
mandatory.8  The Court also looked to federal cases and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure to support its refusal of the implied consent argument.9
The Court further recognized that NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 shift fees in 
derogation of the common law and therefore require a strict contruction.
  
10  Finally, the 
Court emphasized that predictability and fairness require a formal reading of the service 
requirements in NRS 17.115, NRCP 5, and NRCP 68, “including NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)’s 
requirement of express written consent to service by electronic means.”11
 
 
Conclusion 
  In order to shift fees and costs pursuant to NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 an offer of 
judgment must be properly served.  If such service is conducted by facsimile, it must be 
expressly consented to by the receiving party.  Implied consent to service is not 
recognized under Nevada law.  Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s award 
of fees and costs while upholding all other decisions made by the district court.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 NEV.R.CIV.P. 5(b)(2)(D). 
8 See, Moseley v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 654, 664, 188 P.3d 1136, 1144 (2008). 
9 See, FED.R.CIV. P. 5; Ortiz-Moss v. New York City Dept. of Transp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 
2008). 
10 See, Bergman v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993). 
11 NEV.R.CIV.P. 5(b)(2)(D). 
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OPINION 
By the Court, PICKERING, J.: 
            Audrey Quinlan sued Camden USA, Inc. for damages after she tripped on a 
sidewalk in its apartment complex.  She lost at trial and was ordered to pay Camden 
$41,976 in attorney fees and costs.  The district court based its award on the offer of 
judgment Camden made under NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68, which Camden sent by 
facsimile.  Although Quinlan’s lawyer received the offer of judgment, he had not 
expressly consented to fax service as NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) requires.  It was error to shift fees 
and costs based on Camden’s offer of judgment because NRS 17.115, NRCP 5(a), and 
NRCP 68(a) all require an offer of judgment to be served in compliance with NRCP 5 
and Camden’s was not. 
            With the exception of the fee award, no other reversible error appears.  
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment but reverse the award of fees and costs and remand 
so the district court can calculate and award Camden its taxable costs under NRS 
18.020(3). 
I. 
            In contesting Camden’s offer of judgment, Quinlan does not deny she received it.  
Her challenge is technical: An offer of judgment is a creature of statute and rule; NRS 
17.115, NRCP 5(a), and NRCP 68 all require “service” for an effective offer of 
judgment; Camden’s faxed offer of judgment, though received, was not “served” in a 
way NRCP 5(b) recognizes; thus, the district court erred in using Camden’s offer of 
judgment to shift fees and costs to Quinlan. 
            Quinlan makes a valid argument.  NRCP 5(a) is entitled “Service: When 
Required,” while NRCP 5(b) is entitled “Same: How Made.”  NRCP 5(a) specifies that 
“every . . . offer of judgment . . . shall be served upon each of the parties.”  NRS 17.115 
and NRCP 68(a) also say an offer of judgment must be “serve[d].”  For an offer of 
judgment to shift fees and costs as NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 allow, its service must 
comply with NRCP 5(b).  See Magnuson v. Video Yesteryear, 85 F.3d 1424, 1429 (9th 
Cir. 1996) (“In cases involving Rule 68 offers, service . . . must comply with Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 5(b).”). 
            Quinlan had counsel.  NRCP 5(b)(1) provides that, “[w]henever under these rules 
service is required or permitted to be made upon a party represented by an attorney, the 
service shall be made upon the attorney.”  NRCP 5(b)(2) lists the permissible ways to 
serve a party’s attorney.  While NRCP 5(b)(2) permits fax service, it does so only if the 
receiving attorney “has consented to service by electronic means.”  The consent must be 
express, filed with the clerk, and include specific information: 
The served attorney’s . . . consent to service by electronic means shall be expressly stated 
and filed in writing with the clerk of the court and served on the other parties to the 
action. The written consent shall identify: 
            (i) the persons upon whom service must be made; 
            (ii) the appropriate address or location for such service, such as the electronic-
mail address or facsimile number; 
            (iii) the format to be used for attachments; and 
            (iv) any other limits on the scope or duration of the consent. 
NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) (emphasis added). 
            Neither Quinlan nor her attorney filed the written consent to fax service that 
NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) requires.  However, Quinlan’s lawyer occasionally sent case-related 
papers via facsimile—including the informal offer to settle that prompted Camden’s offer 
of judgment.  Camden urges us to accept implied consent as an adequate substitute for 
express consent on these facts. 
            Camden’s implied consent argument fails.  NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) uses “shall” to state 
its requirement of express written consent, filed with the clerk, to service by electronic 
means.  The “use of ‘shall’ is mandatory unless a rule’s construction demands a different 
interpretation to carry out the rule’s purpose.”  Moseley v. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 654, 664, 
188 P.3d 1136, 1144 (2008).  Nevada adopted NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) in 2005 to “permit[ ] 
service by electronic means, including facsimile and electronic-mail, consistent with the 
2001 amendments to the federal rule.”  NRCP 5 drafter’s note (2004).  Under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 5, as amended in 2001, “[t]he consent [to fax service] must be express, and cannot 
be implied from conduct.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 advisory committee’s note (2001).[1] 
            We agree with the federal cases that have rejected implied consent to service by 
fax as a basis for upholding a faxed offer of judgment under Rules 5 and 68.  Ortiz-Moss 
v. New York City Dept. of Transp., 623 F. Supp. 2d 404, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(“[c]onsent to service by electronic means must be specifically agreed to in writing and 
cannot be implied from past conduct”; absent specific written consent, faxed acceptance 
of an offer of judgment is not effective even though the party receiving the fax did not 
object to such service earlier in the litigation) (internal citations omitted); McKenna v. 
Nat’l Action Fin. Servs., No. 07-60880-CIV, 2008 WL 1741495, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 
2008) (rejecting faxed offer of judgment where no written consent to fax service had been 
filed; Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 “requires service of an offer of judgment” and “service may be 
made by electronic means or other alternate means only if written consent is given”), 
reh’g denied, 2008 WL 5572637 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2008); see 4B C. Wright & A. 
Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1147 (3d ed. 2002) (“Consent to service under 
Rule 5(b)(2)(D) must be in writing [and] . . . . cannot be inferred from the conduct of the 
intended recipient.”); Magnuson, 85 F.3d at 1429 (service by fax of the Rule 68 offer was 
inadequate, even though Magnuson apparently did receive a faxed copy of the offer) 
(decided under the pre-2001 version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)).[2] 
            In providing parties with the means to shift fees and costs, NRS 17.115 and 
NRCP 68 offer a tool not available at common law.  See Albios v. Horizon Communities, 
Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 431, 132 P.3d 1022, 1036-37 (2006) (“statutes permitting costs are in 
derogation of the common law [and] should be strictly construed”) (citing Bergmann v. 
Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 679, 856 P.2d 560, 565-66 (1993)).  Use of this tool depends on 
meeting stated time deadlines, Palace Station Hotel & Casino v. Jones, 115 Nev. 162, 
165, 978 P.2d 323, 325 (1999) (time calculations are critical to a predictable application 
of the offer of judgment rules), and other formal requirements.  Pombo v. Nevada 
Apartment Ass’n, 113 Nev. 559, 562, 938 P.2d 725, 727 (1997) (“An offer of judgment 
must be unconditional and for a definite amount in order to be valid for purposes of 
NRCP 68”). Predictability and fairness are not served by reading the formal service 
requirements out of NRS 17.115, NRCP 5, and NRCP 68, including NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)’s 
requirement of express written consent to service by electronic means. 
            The district court upheld the fax service under EDCR 7.26(a)(3), which lists 
facsimile service as a permissible form of service but is silent on whether consent to such 
service is required and, if so, what form it must take.[3]  Considered by itself, in isolation 
from NRCP 5(b)(2)(D), EDCR 7.26(a)(3) can fairly be read to permit fax service as 
freely as service by mail or by hand.  When EDCR 7.26(a)(3) is read together with NRCP 
5(b)(2)(D), however, the only reading that gives meaning to both rules is to read EDCR 
7.26(a)(3) as permitting fax service in general, provided NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)’s express 
consent requirement has been met.  See Albios, 122 Nev. at 418, 422, 132 P.3d at 1028, 
1030-31 (if possible, “this court will interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules 
and statutes,” especially where, as here, one provision is silent on specifics included in 
another).  A contrary reading puts EDCR 7.26(a)(3) in conflict with NRCP 5(b)(2)(D)’s 
express written consent requirement, in which case NRCP 5(b)(2)(D) still controls.  
Cheek v. FNF Constr., Inc., 112 Nev. 1249, 1253, 924 P.2d 1347, 1350 (1996) (“‘[t]he 
district courts have rule-making power, but the rules they adopt must not be in conflict 
with the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure’” (alteration in original) (quoting Western 
Mercury, Inc. v. The Rix Co., 84 Nev. 218, 222-23, 438 P.2d 792, 795 (1968), and citing 
NRCP 83, which states that “[e]ach district court . . . may from time to time make and 
amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules”). 
            Since Camden’s offer of judgment was not properly served, it does not operate to 
shift fees and costs.  We therefore reverse their award and remand for the district court to 
determine Camden’s taxable costs. 
II. 
            Quinlan also asserts error in the district court’s admission of daytime photographs 
when her injury occurred at night; its refusal to grant her request for a jury view of the 
sidewalk; its allowance of a late-designated witness’s testimony; and its denial of her new 
trial motion.  We review these claims of evidentiary, trial, and post-trial error for an 
abuse of discretion, Sheehan & Sheehan v. Nelson Malley & Co., 121 Nev. 481, 492, 117 
P.3d 219, 226 (2005) (explaining that the district court has “broad discretion in 
determining the admissibility of evidence” (internal quotation omitted)); Dep’t of Hwys. 
v. Haapanen, 84 Nev. 722, 723, 448 P.2d 703, 704 (1968) (indicating that the decision to 
grant or deny a jury viewing is reviewed for abuse of discretion); Southern Pac. Transp. 
Co. v. Fitzgerald, 94 Nev. 241, 244, 577 P.2d 1234, 1236 (1978) (“[t]he decision to grant 
or deny a motion for new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will 
not be disturbed . . . absent palpable abuse), and none exists here. 
            Accordingly, we affirm the judgment on the jury’s verdict, vacate the judgment 
awarding fees and costs, and remand for calculation of taxable costs. 
  
HARDESTY and DOUGLAS, JJ., concur. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        We note that Rules 9(c) and 13 of Nevada’s Electronic Filing Rules are not at 
issue on this appeal but that they impose consent and registration requirements that 
satisfy NRCP 5(b)(2)(D). 
[2]        The facts before us stop short of those found to work an estoppel in Albertson v. 
Winner Automotive, No. Civ.A.01-116KAJ, 2004 WL 2435290 (D. Del. Oct. 27, 2004).  
There, the defendant served its offer of judgment on the plaintiff by fax.  The plaintiff 
accepted the offered judgment by written “Notice of Acceptance,” which he formally 
served by hand.  The court treated the plaintiff’s “Notice of Acceptance” as consent to 
service by fax and held, further, that the defendant was estopped to disavow the validity 
of its faxed offer of judgment, noting that Rule 5(b) protects the recipient not the sender.  
Id. at *5. 
[3]        EDCR 7.26(a) states, in relevant part: 
If service of an order or other paper is to be made on a party represented by an attorney, 
the service must be made on the attorney unless service on the party is ordered by the 
court.  Service on the attorney or on a party must be made by: 
                        (1) delivering a copy or by mailing it to the last known address; or 
                        (2) if no address is known, by leaving it with the clerk of the court; or 
                        (3) facsimile transmission; or 
                        (4) electronic transmission through the Court’s electronic filing system if 
the system provides for electronic service. 
 
